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Despite considerable progress that organizations have made during the past 20 
years to increase the representation of women at board level, they still hold few 
board seats. Drawing on a qualitative study involving 30 companies with women 
directors in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Ghana, we investigate 
how the relationship between gender in the boardroom and corporate 
governance operates. The findings indicate that the presence of a minority of 
women on the board has an insignificant effect on board performance. Yet the 
chairperson’s role is vital in leading the change for recruiting and evaluating 
candidates and their commitment to the board with diversity and governance in 
mind. Our study also sheds light on the multifaceted reasons why women 
directors appear to be resisting the discourse of gender quotas. 
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Introduction 
Recently, the composition of corporate boards has been widely debated 
(Sayce & Özbilgin, 2014; Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008). Motivated by 
the divergence in findings relating to the links among gender diversity, board 
effectiveness, and firm performance (Dalton & Dalton, 2009), this article presents 
results from a qualitative study, based on interviews with women directors from 
the top 50 companies in the United Kingdom, United States, and Ghana by 
exploring their perceptions regarding the role they play in the boardrooms. The 
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findings reveal women’s personal motives, boardroom development activities, 
board working relationships, and perspectives on board performance and gender 
quotas. We unpack the interplay of gender diversity and boardroom performance, 
as perceived by our participants.  
The role of women in top management teams and leadership positions is 
well documented (Wittenberg-Cox & Maitland, 2008). A growing literature 
(McKinsey & Company, 2010) indicates the potential benefits of women at the 
board level. However, women still hold few board seats. According to a recent 
report by Board Watch, only 15 percent of directors in the United Kingdom’s 
FTSE 100 companies are women, and there were just 9.4 percent in the FTSE 250 
in 2011 (News Alert, 2012). In the United States, women constitute 16 percent of 
the directors of S&P 500 companies (Spencer Stuart, 2010) and in most other 
countries that figure ranges between 0.1 percent and 15 percent (Catalyst, 2011).  
The difficulties involved in improving boards’ gender balance have 
prompted the introduction of new governance guidelines such as the Higgs (2003) 
report, drawing attention to the need for increased diversity in the United 
Kingdom, which requires all FTSE 350 companies with less than 20 percent of 
women on the board to explain their board composition. Some European countries 
have introduced gender quota legislation (Tatli & Özbilgin, 2012). In Norway, 
since 2006, all listed companies must have 40 percent women directors on their 
board; otherwise, the stock exchange will delist them (Clarke & Branson, 2010). 
As the European champion, Norway jumped from having 22 percent of women on 
boards in 2004 to 28.8 percent in 2006, to 44.2 percent in 2010, as a result of 
quota legislation. Norway’s impressive growth path is followed by that of Sweden 
(26.9 percent), Finland (25.7 percent), and Denmark (18.1 percent). Although 
controversial (Forstenlechner, Lettice, & Özbilgin, 2012), such a “quota” system 
has proven efficient to boost the number of women on boards. 
Quota legislations are often based on the view that the representation of 
women on boards may significantly affect the governance of companies. One 
argument is that women’s equal participation may enhance company financial 
performance (Catalyst, 2011), change board behavior, and enhance independence 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and proactivity (Westphal & Bednar, 2005). Most 
importantly, gender diversity reportedly guards against the “groupthink” 
phenomenon (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Robinson & Dechant, 1997) and 
can provide greater access to resources and networks (Fray & Guillaume, 2007; 
Milliken & Martins, 1996), create career incentives through signaling and 
mentoring (Daily et al., 2003; Sheridan, 1995) and enhance public and investor 
relations and legitimacy (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). Our study sheds light on the 
complex relationship between gender diversity and boardroom performance.  
Our data are valuable, as it is hard to access boardrooms. Studies on the 
topic tend to draw on quantitative methods that use narrow proxies for 
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performance, such as nonattendance of board meetings (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
In order to overcome this challenge, researchers have resorted to putative 
measures of board performance, that is, board observable diversity issues such as 
race, age, or gender (Milliken & Martins, 1996). Our research focuses on whether 
functional diversity such as education, technical abilities, functional background, 
and nonregulated aspects of diversity such as socioeconomic background, 
personality characteristics, or values (Milliken & Martins, 1996) affect board 
effectiveness. The presence of a small number of women on the board has an 
insignificant effect on board performance. If women are a minority in the 
boardroom, they are less likely to challenge their male counterparts. Research also 
suggests that the chairperson’s role is vital in addressing diversity (Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse, 2008).  
More generally, this paper contributes to the literature on diversity and 
governance by providing a better understanding of how the relationship between 
board gender and corporate governance operates. Despite numerous studies on 
gender issues and corporate performance (Dobbin & Jung, 2011), the real effects 
of women directors on corporate governance are still not clearly understood. It is 
important to probe the factors in board processes that are crucial to board 
effectiveness. This study extends the literature by providing evidence of key 
determinants of women’s representation and contributions by adopting a relational 
approach. A relational approach emphasizes interactions between multiple levels 
of analysis, moving beyond the unidirectional relationship between “cause and 
consequence” (Özbilgin, 2006), which has largely dominated the corporate 
governance literature. Such an approach (Özbilgin, 2006; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005) 
offers a unique understanding of how governance structures and individual 
perceptions and practices interplay in their specific historical and local context and 
web of relationships.  
The study sheds light on the contexts of three countries, of which one is 
non-Western/Anglo-Saxon. Ghana, however, includes elements of “residual” 
culture (Bryson, 2008), which, in a dialectic interaction with other societal norms 
and beliefs, might explain culturally “dominant” aspects of education, career 
paths, or corporate behaviors.  
The article is structured as follows. First, we review theoretical perspectives 
on the relationships between board diversity and corporation governance 
effectiveness. The methodology and sample characteristics of the study are then 
explained. After this, the article offers the key findings and analysis of the results 
regarding whether and how gender composition of corporate boards matters. The 
study concludes with a discussion of the implications of our research on literature, 
practice, and future research.  
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Gender Diversity–Board Performance 
Relationship  
Since Berle and Means (1932) proposed the principal-agent philosophy of 
the modern theory of the firm, the debate about the way organizations are 
governed and controlled has been central to corporate governance studies (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The traditional agency theory is based on 
the assumption that in a modern corporation, there is a separation of ownership 
and management that leads to costs associated with resolving conflict between 
owners as principals and managers as agents. To mitigate agency costs, the 
corporation applies a number of corporate governance mechanisms such as laws, 
contracts, incentives, and monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Despite the 
influence of agency theory on the board process, a growing body of empirical 
research casts doubt on its efficacy by focusing on the structural characteristics of 
boards and their relationship to firm performance (Hillman, Shropshire, & 
Cannella, 2007; Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005)—in particular, whether the 
gender issue matters to enforce contracts and minimize agency costs.  
Resource dependency theory suggests the appointment of representatives of 
interdependent organizations as a means for gaining access to resources critical to 
a firm’s success (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972). This theory places 
emphasis on the role that directors play in securing essential resources for an 
organization through their expertise and linkages to other institutions (Johnson, 
Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996), since they possess human capital (i.e., directors’ advice, 
skills, and expertise) as well as social capital (i.e., the sum of social resources 
embedded in a social relationship) (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008). We can view 
directors’ networks as both “social and symbolic capital” (Bourdieu, 1986, 1989); 
they evidence how the firm can enhance its standing in the eyes of employees, 
customers, and the public. Thus, a woman who holds an executive role at a 
company may raise the firm’s reputation, even if the firm has not historically been 
motivated by corporate social responsibility.  
Studies that seek to explore the interplay between boardroom diversity and 
corporate performance need to tackle the issue of dealing with multiple levels, i.e. 
individual choices and chances (agency) in the corporate context (structures). For 
example, the application of Bourdieu’s theory highlights a further aspect which 
bridges the “agency-structure” dichotomy. The focus on agency-structure invites a 
cause-and-consequence perspective, as it repeatedly seeks to identify ways in 
which one exercises “agentic” capacity in order to exert influence in terms of 
desired personal or institutionally based outcomes (Bandura, 2002). There are, 
however, various other related aspects, which a relational, multilevel perspective 
allows to emerge. Applications of Bourdieu’s theory have used dispositions, 
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habitus, and field, at the micro, meso, and macro levels, respectively (Karatas-
Ozkan & Chell, 2010). Ahern and Dittmar (2011) locate Bourdieu within the body 
of “practice theory,” characterized by reenactment between individual action and 
context. Maclean, Harvey, and Chia (2010, p. 347), however, apply Bourdieu’s 
theory in an “instrumental” manner, to highlight links between power and the 
“command over resources” as an ultimate form of symbolic capital in corporate 
governance. 
With its emphasis on internal firm resources as sources of competitive 
advantage, the resource-based approach (Peteraf, 1993) views the board as a 
resource that can not only supplant its need for other resources but also improve 
the company’s performance. Hence, the board offers a set of capabilities that 
provide key sources of sustainable competitive advantage. Pfeffer (1972) suggests 
that the board’s size and background of independent directors are important for 
management of an organization’s needs for capital and regulatory compliance. 
Although the relationship between board and firm performance makes resource 
dependency theory a key theory in corporate governance (Pfeffer, 1972), there are 
still issues that one could potentially address by moving away from the concept of 
the board of directors as a locus of control toward a more multifaceted role 
determined by a number of environmental factors (Cullen, Kirwan, & Brennan, 
2007). Issues such as board structure, composition, characteristics, and 
independence conditions become important variables in determining board 
effectiveness and corporate financial performance. To constitute a source of 
competitive advantage, the board’s human capital pool must have high levels of 
both skill and willingness to exhibit productive behavior. Diversity and effective 
board processes can provide sustainable competitive advantage (Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse, 2008). Tatli and Özbilgin (2012) have criticized the unidirectional link 
that has been made between performance and demographics. They propose the 
creation of a distinction between an etic, that is, a “fixed” and “predetermined” set 
of notions about diversity, and an emic, that is, a relational and context-specific set 
of aspects. Emic investigation is particularly important for comparative studies 
and those that involve more than one context, such as this one. 
Singh (2007) has linked human capital theory (Becker, 1964) with resource 
dependency theory by examining how a board of directors’ investment in personal 
development enhances the benefits for both the individual and the firm. Some 
feminist studies have focused on the politics of presence of this two-dimensional 
description of power. It is claimed that social, gender, and ethnic diversity within 
the institution or board is key to meet the needs and desires of all (Phillips, 1998). 
Calas and Smircich (1992) have criticized such arguments. They place emphasis 
on “gendered” approaches used to propagate knowledge within organizational 
contexts. Britton (2000, pp. 418–419) argues that attributes such as “gender, race 
or class” are “presumed and reproduced” within organizations, predominantly via 
a juxtaposition between “masculinity” and “femininity.” However, Ross-Smith 
  6 
and Huppatz (2010) have explored embodied cultural capital as an aspect of 
feminist discourse rooted in prior conceptualizations of power and gender depicted 
on the body—a vehicle of “carrying the self” (Davies, 1997, p. 3). Power is a key 
link between the feminist perspective and the corporate governance literature, 
particularly in terms of the ways in which organizations have used the concept in 
order to justify equality or access (Sayce & Özbilgin, 2014). In terms of corporate 
governance, organizations also have latent power from the viewpoint of the 
Bourdieuan “habitus,” by incorporating the “know-how” or “disposition” of 
“getting on” or “being in the game” (Maclean et al., 2010).  
Finally, the distinction between masculinity and femininity has been 
prevalent in the corporate governance literature (Machold, Pervaiz, & Farquah, 
2008); namely, there are either “masculinist” ethics, as highlighted in the 
dominant discourses of resources, or “feminist” ethics, as highlighted in the 
dominant discourses of relationship and caring. Hafsi and Turgut (2012) argue 
that board diversity can be a determinant of care toward social issues within a 
corporate social performance model. Previous literature (Tienari, Vaara, & 
Merilainen, 2010) has identified gender-specific traits in terms of corporate 
boards, while masculinity, in particular, has become part of a prevalent identity, as 
well as a discourse in terms of board-level executives (Tienari et al., 2010). While 
gender diversity may challenge masculine domination of boards, the literature 
cautions us that changes in head counts and representation are important but 
insufficient conditions for changing power and inequality structures (Sayce & 
Özbilgin, 2014). Such theoretical considerations do not avoid the trappings of 
“essentialism” in typifying feminine or masculine values or traits, which is part of 
Syed and Murray’s (2008) as well as Özbilgin, Beauregard, Tatli, and Bell’s 
(2011) “cultural” argument. Intersectionality may be a way to address such 
trappings by further explicating relationships between different levels of analysis 
and transforming related capitals (Tatli & Özbilgin, 2012).  
In conclusion, corporate governance theories support board diversity on the 
basis that a diverse board operates to reduce agency costs, facilitates access to 
untapped resources and networks, and improves performance. Building on 
Boxall’s (1996, p. 67) claim that the resource-based view of human resource 
advantage (i.e., the superiority of one board over another) consists of the potential 
to capture a supply of exceptional human talent and human process (i.e., “causally 
ambiguous, socially complex, historically evolved such as learning, cooperation, 
and innovation”), we explore whether gender diversity in the board contributes to 
boardroom process advantage.  
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Empirical Literature on Gender 
Diversity and Firm Performance  
Although there are various theories relating to the impact of board diversity 
on board performance, the empirical literature is largely inconclusive. The major 
debate on the value of board diversity within management is on corporate 
performance. These are predominantly quantitative studies that test for a 
relationship between board diversity and various measures of profitability and 
stock valuation (Kramer, Konrad, & Erkut, 2006). Gender diversity has been 
viewed as an asset toward reducing agency costs and improving corporate 
performance. Many US studies (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Hillman et al., 2007) 
have found a positive relationship between the representation of women on the 
board and stock return. Some studies have attempted to explain this positive 
correlation. Extending Baysinger and Butler’s (1985, p. 114) argument that “top-
performing firms may be willing to invite independent directors on to their boards 
in order to appear progressive,” companies may appoint women directors when the 
board believes it can afford to have a woman on the board. Ryan and Haslam 
(2007), however, argue that companies are more likely to appoint women to 
leadership positions where change is required.  
There are numerous studies that find either no effect of board diversity on 
financial performance or find negative effects (Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994; 
Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2000). The missing moderator variables 
might explain the inconclusive evidence with respect to the influence that female 
directors actually have on the board (Miller & Triana, 2009). Judge (2003) argues 
that although having more women on boards is generally regarded as positive, in 
fact, women leaders can also have a negative impact on performance (Haslam & 
Ryan, 2008). Examining FTSE 100 companies during the period 2001–2005, 
Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, and Atkins, (2010) conclude that companies 
with male-only boards achieve higher valuation than those with a woman on their 
board due to the perception that poorly performing women may lead to a firm’s 
negative valuation. Furthermore, despite the positive initiative for Norwegian 
public companies to include women on boards, a recent study found that such 
firms had a decrease in profitability (Matsa & Miller, 2011) and value (Ahern & 
Dittmar, 2011).  
There is no consensus on the effect of gender diversity on corporate 
performance with respect to studies using panel data. However, these studies are 
of limited value, as they do not report what transpires within a boardroom and do 
not measure each director’s individual contribution to the decision-making process 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Moreover, these studies have not examined gender-
balanced boards because they are rare. Overall, studies are relatively silent on the 
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mechanisms that cause diverse boards to perform differently (Hoogendoorn, 
Oosterbeek, & van Praag, 2011).  
The use of a qualitative method helps us gain an in-depth understanding of 
whether and, if yes, how women directors make a difference to board 
effectiveness. In particular, this study draws attention to the role of the chairperson 
with respect to the contribution of women in the boardroom, as well as boardroom 
behavior and dynamics. In addition to adopting a relational perspective, we 
employ insights from resource-based theory, behavioral theory on boards, and 
corporate governance (Cyert & March, 1963), as well as from research on social 
representational theory, namely, justice, resources, and interests (Phillips, 1998). 
The Study 
The inconclusiveness of prior quantitative research on board diversity and 
performance is the main factor that has led us to adopt a qualitative study 
involving 30 interviews with women directors. This approach allows us to explore 
complex issues that have human interaction at their core (Culpepper & Gilbert, 
1999) by seeking views from board insiders, and to establish what impact 
respondents think board diversity has on processes and corporate governance. 
English is spoken in the three selected countries; this has eliminated the 
need for translation services and potential loss of meanings. In Ghana, English is 
the language of the former colonial structure and remains one of the official 
languages. Language can be part of the perceived “residual” culture (Bryson, 
2008). In interaction with other norms and values (which might even be 
antithetical to it), it may contribute to the formation of symbolic capital in this 
context.  
In terms of sampling, the top 50 publicly listed companies in the United 
Kingdom, United States, and Ghana have been targeted. These countries display 
different levels of gender-related development (as per the Gender-related 
Development Index [GDI]) and gender inequality (as per the Gender Inequality 
Index [GII]), and also exhibit differences in terms of their institutional, market, 
and business sophistication (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 
2012). 
The reason for this selection is twofold. First, we want to find out whether 
there are unique boardroom behaviors among an elite set of female directors who 
sit on boards of top companies in both advanced (i.e., the United Kingdom and 
United States) and developing economies (i.e., Ghana), in terms of business and 
market sophistication (UNDP, 2012). Although the inequalities in achievement 
between women and men in the selected countries as captured by both indexes are 
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significant, all three economies operate under the same corporate governance 
regime, namely, shareholder orientation. The second factor is data accessibility. 
We share Schwandt’s (2000, p. 202) thoughts that “the idea of acquiring an 
‘inside’ understanding … is a powerful central concept for understanding the 
purpose of qualitative enquiry.”  
Difficulties were encountered in reaching potential respondents (see Table 
I). The population is small, and high levels of trust are required to initiate contact 
with these women and discuss sensitive topics (Atkinson & Flint, 2004; Rhodes, 
Kling, & Johnston, 2004).  
 [Insert Table I about here] 
Building on the output of research programs over the past 20 years, we 
established contacts with top listed companies and were given access to an elite of 
female directors. We used a “snowballing” sampling method, a link-tracing 
technique that relies on a series of referrals within a circle of people who know 
each other or are loosely connected, to obtain a wider range of research contacts, 
in order to provide an account of meanings and activities from inside the unknown 
(Atkinson & Flint, 2004). The selection of samples is based on insider knowledge 
and referral chains among subjects who possess common traits that are of research 
interest (Kaplan, Korf, & Sterk, 1987).  
We interviewed female board members with whom we had direct or 
indirect personal or professional contacts. A chain referral technique improved our 
access, as a director’s referral to colleagues provides a level of trust and a 
perception of being an insider. This is especially important when respondents are 
asked to comment on sensitive topics ranging from their behavior and 
performance and those of their colleagues, to their views about their contributions.  
We conducted semistructured interviews of 60 minutes each, on average. 
The interviews were intended to collect the perceptions associated with women 
directors’ experience and contribution in the boardroom. We use extracts that 
allow us to identify a set of transverse generic themes. The respondents have 
boardroom experience spanning from 4 to 14 years. Some have held 
simultaneously as many as seven board positions, including charities and nonlisted 
companies, while others have held only two board positions. Before the interview, 
participants were informed about the nature and reason for the meeting. They were 
assured of confidentiality, concerning both personal details and the companies on 
whose boards they sit. Due to a small population and to protect the company 
and/or individual’s possible identification, we cannot make reference to the sectors 
in the sample.  
There was virtually no hesitance or concern among the interviewees. It is 
worth noting that all of our respondents are individuals who often interview. Any 
noted differences in response style were certainly contextual. In addition to asking 
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respondents to discuss their experiences, we asked them to verify biographical 
information such as race, ethnicity, and board role. We tape-recorded and 
transcribed some of the interviews, while we captured others by note taking, to 
accommodate the various degrees of respondents’ comfort zone. 
The approach to data analysis followed the model of conversation analysis 
(Atkinson & Heritage, 1984). The collection and transcription processes were 
ongoing, with regular meetings between coauthors to discuss individual 
interviews. These sessions were open-ended, with themes emerging as the 
outcomes of our agreement. Our approach is interpretive data analysis where every 
inference is rooted in specific textual evidence of collected narratives, whether 
they are transcripts or interview notes (Denzin, 1989).  
Ewick and Silbey (1998, p. 29) observe that what “people tell about 
themselves and their lives, both constitute and interpret those lives.” Our approach 
was a bottom-up analysis, and to analyze the interview transcript, we used the 
method of idea concentration, namely, thematic analyses (Kvale, 1996). This 
method consists of identifying main ideas and themes and singling out essential 
information. Data were sorted into five categories. Our results represent only 
views of our sample and offer “native” insights for subsequent testing.  
Findings and Analysis 
Our thematic analysis of interview transcripts and notes produced insightful 
findings regarding five main influences of women directors on board processes 
and dynamics: necessary resources, boardroom development, work relationships in 
the boardroom, contribution and board performance, and boardroom quotas. The 
combination of these categories describes a board’s behavioral dynamics, upon 
which the actual board effectiveness depends, while taking into account how the 
web of interpersonal and group relationships between men and women directors 
develops (Roberts et al., 2005).  
Necessary Resources  
Although the progress of women on the board has been slow, considerable 
change in attitudes has taken place in the past 15 years. Respondents commented 
that companies are making efforts to diversify their boards toward true fairness.  
Culturally, it is far more difficult for a woman at all levels to 
succeed professionally. High power distance and tribal ties are still 
very strong. … I was motivated and had the right skills and right 
connections to be invited to this board. (P8, Ghana) 
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The Ghanaian family structure provides for a large network of kinship 
relationships. People usually feel obliged to help kinship emotionally or through 
cultural expectations and, as such, tribal ties are an effective lever that women can 
use to gain boardroom access. However, during the past decade, the right skill set 
is also becoming almost as important. Although the filial ties appear less important 
within the US context, having a good education and an effective network 
constitute an advantage. One respondent added: 
Women need a good education, both academic and on-the-job 
training in corporate level jobs as well as good networks. Usually, 
someone from your network will recommend you to a president or 
invite you on their board. (P11, United States) 
In addition to her Harvard education, P11 made use of her father’s 
gubernatorial network to gain her first board post. When we inquired whether her 
father’s position had been an advantage to secure her first board role, she replied 
“in a way,” but was quick to point out that she was already a high-flying 
executive. 
In the United Kingdom, one participant noted that high motivation, 
effective networks, and financial skills are critical for women’s entry to the board.  
To be attractive to the boardroom, a woman needs to have the right 
skill set and a sound network and take time to listen and learn. I 
think that a woman with financial skills is more likely to be invited 
into the boardroom. (P3, UK) 
A strong network is a valuable resource that women can exercise in order to 
open the boardroom’s doors. A participant noted: “There are many talented 
women … but without the sound networks, they often cannot see the way forward 
on how to fulfil their own ambition” (P4, United Kingdom). Ghanaian participants 
are aware of their privileged position in society and are open about their advantage 
as a result of foreign-based education (predominantly in the United Kingdom and 
United States). They acknowledge that their success is to a great extent due to 
their filial ties and social standing, but “one must be motivated to take advantage 
of the opportunities and be prepared to work hard.” (P12, Ghana) 
In the United Kingdom and United States, participants do not talk openly 
about privilege or education networks. Only after some probing did some 
acknowledge that having a privileged background helps open the boardroom 
doors. While some tried to deny that their background was an advantage, one UK 
participant added, “It is difficult to know whether one’s background is an 
advantage or disadvantage. It very much depends on the context” (P30, United 
Kingdom). Whether explicitly or implicitly stated, the necessary resources that a 
woman needs to have in order to penetrate the boardroom are commitment, an 
effective network, and sound education.  
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Emphasis regarding resources varies among participants, as well as the 
examples that provide dimensions to these properties—consistent/inconsistent, 
filial/educational, privileged/common. Although commitment and education are 
necessary criteria for recruiting women directors, the recruiting process is 
nonetheless predominantly through personal recommendation, which requires 
networks.  
Supporting the preceding is Higgs’s (2003) and Tyson’s (2003) findings 
that almost half of the directors that they surveyed in the United Kingdom had 
been recruited through personal friendships and contacts. Only 4 percent had a 
formal interview, and only 1 percent obtained the role through answering an 
advertisement. Cross-national differences are not significant, particularly 
regarding properties. There is a noted difference between candidates in terms of 
order of importance (e.g., network or commitment) but not between different 
national contexts. In terms of networks, filial networks appear to be more 
predominant in Ghana, while educational networks seem to be more prominently 
reported in the United Kingdom, with the United States providing a mixture. The 
necessary resources for boardroom entrance are defined as commitment, network, 
and education along the spectrum of their dimensions (consistent/inconsistent, 
filial/educational, privileged/common). 
Boardroom Development 
Privileged education and experience may open the boardroom door, but 
these do not necessarily prepare one for performance. The need to develop human 
capital at the board level for improved performance has been recognized; however, 
the alignment between the skills represented on the board and those required by its 
strategic intent is not always effectively pursued. The actual level of human capital 
(i.e., board directors) changes over time and thus requires monitoring for its match 
with the board’s strategic needs. Yet our participants indicate that boards often do 
not have a budget for directors’ development and that development is “by doing,” 
while large budgets are allocated for management training and development: 
“From my experience, the boardroom usually does not have budgets for directors’ 
training” (P4, UK).  
One participant stated, “To improve upon boardroom performance, there is 
a need for boardroom education, both academic and on-the-job mentoring and 
coaching” (P11, United States).  
Participants perceive boardroom development as a very important, 
necessary activity that has been underresourced and often ignored. They expressed 
the need for directors’ formal development through education and training, as well 
as coaching and mentoring. Some stated that development budgets for directors 
are not available due to the expectation that they already have the necessary skills 
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and capabilities for the boardroom. Others held the view that because they were 
not permanent employees, corporations do not feel obliged to invest in their 
development. Absence of development activities may affect women, the 
nontraditional and new participants of the boardroom, more negatively than it does 
men. A number of participants asserted that “mentoring” provided one such 
alternative mechanism for development, particularly important for women and 
minorities. One director commented,  “Having an understanding mentor who is 
also board chairman has been tremendous help for my effectiveness at this board 
(P23, Ghana). 
Work Relationships in the Boardroom 
Women directors who make it to the board have already demonstrated their 
knowledge, skills, and capabilities. Yet, they appear to need to gain credibility 
before they can be accepted. Once women enter the boardroom: 
It takes time for women to establish their credibility on a board and 
understand how that board works. … A newcomer needs to 
understand the rules and conversation of what is spoken and what 
is not said, and that takes time. (P5, United States) 
Gaining credibility is equally important for women on Ghanaian boards: “I 
think that it does not matter how you get to the board. What counts is what you do 
once you are there” (P27, Ghana).  
For UK participants, in addition to credibility and interpersonal skills, there 
is a need for “women to be capable of fitting in with the culture and at times 
almost be chameleon-like. They need to modify their approach and use their 
emotional intelligence to deal with different situations and build relationships” 
(P15, UK).  
Institutionally, individuals can view board directors as “over-socialized 
actors,” either following certain cognitive, normative, and regulatory patterns or 
complying with the rules and the logic of each particular board (DiMaggio & 
Powel, 1983). Moreover, research suggests that there is a significant cohesion 
among corporate elites’ “inner circles,” formed by board directors (Domhoff, 
2002). Our participants are aware that men and women need to grow accustomed 
to each other in the boardroom setting. It is not as much a power play, although 
power is always present, but “rather getting used to the new reality and being 
comfortable with it” (P28, UK)—this is a common explanation of working 
relationships in the boardroom. “Board culture is peculiar—it is formal but always 
cordial, and nobody ever is cutting each other off, and so you must pay attention 
not to be totally off the page in how you interact with others …” (P14, UK). One 
does not challenge one’s colleague at the board meetings, as those relationships 
are cordial, but often fragile. According to a UK participant, “This gives [him/her] 
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an opportunity to prepare a response. You do not want to embarrass your 
colleague and look bad as a result of being caught off-guard” (P15, UK).  
In the United States, the CEO/chairperson is a pivotal figure on the board 
with full board control and is the first point of call. One participant explained:  
I will raise it with the CEO/chairman beforehand. You don’t just 
throw a bomb into the room. More often than not, the 
CEO/Chairman will raise the issue and ask for board comments. 
(P7, United States). 
Differences between what people say and what they actually mean is 
common (Hatch, 1997). Women need to be capable of fitting in with the culture 
and modifying their approach to deal with different situations. Since some male 
directors in previously homogeneous boards may feel uncomfortable working with 
female colleagues, many women directors often feel a need to prove themselves in 
order to gain acceptance. According to one participant: 
The best advice I can give is you have arrived. You do not need to 
prove anything anymore. Just sit back, observe others, and learn. 
Once you understand the issues, question [them] in the 
contextually acceptable manner. (P26, UK) 
The respondents underscored that they need to learn to fit into the board 
environment and blend with male colleagues. Literature suggests that devoting 
sufficient time to the boardroom role and an appropriate amount of time to 
learning is necessary to be able to contribute (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Nadler, 
2004). Many respondents have recognized this and have chosen not to express 
their views initially to avoid possible conflict. Even the tone of voice is important 
in the boardroom. This interesting insight is a good example of the “embodiment” 
aspect, as scholars have previously highlighted (e.g., Davies, 1997). 
Any woman that enters the board is treated with a good dose of 
suspicion. … One needs to be diligent, patient, and have a voice 
coach. A woman with an overly feminine, piercing, and shrill 
voice is never really accepted on the board even if she has a 
supportive chairman. (P30, UK) 
Women often feel the need to fit in due to the low female representation in 
boardrooms. New women on the board are entering a new culture and therefore 
feel they need to adjust their behavior. To make the board a more comfortable 
place for women requires considerably more women to be present on the board. 
“Having more women on the board does not mean that you have a closer 
relationship with the other woman or women, but rather that it is more difficult to 
ignore 30 or 40 per cent of the board members” (P28, United States).  
Kramer et al. (2006) suggest that women as a minority on the board have 
experiences of others not listening to them and exclusion from socializing and 
even from decision making; additionally, they have been subjected to 
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inappropriate behaviors, which indicates that male directors notice their gender 
more than their individual contributions. A chairperson’s sensitivity and skills 
impact on both board relations and contribution:  
It is the sensitivity of the chairman to diversity and his skills to 
create space in meetings for everyone to contribute that creates 
positive relationships. Managing the interaction between highly 
opinionated people is a real skill. (P27, Ghana) 
To contribute to board dynamics, women directors need to understand not 
only the board’s rules and regulations but also other directors through the 
interaction with other members (see Table II). It is only through deliberative 
dialogue that members can meet both needs in heterogeneous boards, in order to 
accommodate different perspectives (Kakabadse, Kakabadse, & Knyght, 2010).  
 [Insert Table II about here] 
A powerful chairperson and/or CEO or other directors with unique 
resources can exercise power within the board whether for a perceived good or 
not. Power is a concept that is unavoidably value dependent, as “both its definition 
and any given use of it, once defined, are inextricably tied to a given set of 
(probably unacknowledged) value-assumptions which predetermine the range of 
its empirical application” (Lukes, 2005, p. 30); similarly, they would be able to 
induce “mobilization of bias” (Rodrigo, 2005) by promoting particular values, 
opinions, board culture, rituals, and procedures. 
Contribution and Board Performance 
It is only through the processes of communicative interactions that women 
can have board impact, which may later amplify to transform the patterns of 
dynamics and ultimately board performance (Kakabadse, Kakabadse, & Barratt, 
2006; Stacey, 2007). In practice, however, “the impact of women directors on 
board effectiveness is differential, depending on whether they can raise sensitive 
issues successfully … and challenge their colleagues in a supportive way” (P17, 
United Kingdom). The ways in which women directors engage in board 
interactions can have important implications for processes and dynamics. One 
female director explained that:  
Having a diverse board is important. People are forced to listen to 
the views of others, but these views often need to be moderated by 
a steady-handed chairman. Only then can those dialogues lead to 
more effective decisions and, in turn, enhanced corporate 
performance. (P1, Ghana) 
However, to make a value-added contribution, a UK respondent noted: 
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One has to have something special, one’s personal kind of magic. 
… That is, you need at least one thing that distinguishes you from 
others … that builds your brand and creates value. (P4, UK) 
The importance of effective dialogue is emphasized by many participants as 
it is the main lever for direct contribution:  
Although the board climate was positive, I still had to convince my 
colleagues of my principles. It paid off. We now talk about social 
benefits. (Ghana, P23) 
Access to the chairman’s attention, knowledge, and memory, which in turn 
influence the perception or “framing” of the problem situation, is a valuable 
resource that women directors need (Lindenberg, 2003). Participating in the early 
strategic decision-making stages enables women directors to influence the desired 
outcome (Rindova, 1999).  
Prior literature (e.g., Kramer et al., 2006) has stressed that women make a 
difference in the boardroom by a collaborative leadership style characterized by 
increased listening, social support, win-win problem solving, bringing new issues 
and perspectives to the table, and broadening the content of boardroom 
discussions, as well as by asking tough questions and demanding direct and 
detailed answers. It is in that vein that some view gender diversity as enhancing 
debates (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). Nonetheless, this is actionable only if 
the board has an effective chairperson. In the view of one female director, diverse 
boards can be more effective due to “women’s effect on board dynamics. Women 
have different experiences and are more likely to see problems from different 
perspectives and often in a more creative way” (P10, Ghana). One US female 
director feels strongly that: 
 The CEO/Chairman is the key in terms of women contributing 
fully, by being even handed in taking contributions from all board 
members. It is the chairman that makes the board effective or not. 
(P9, United States) 
Participants view the chairperson (CEO/chairperson in the United States) as 
vital in supporting the participation of women directors toward board 
effectiveness. Prior literature and praxis have recognized the chairperson’s role in 
promoting gender diversity (Davies, 2011). Board leadership is critical, as it sets 
the tone for meetings, behavior expected, and willingness of board members to 
listen to each other (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008). Most importantly, it ensures 
a culture for contribution. As one participant noted, “Diverse boards are definitely 
more effective, provided they have a chairman that has sound boardroom skills … 
(so that) a more penetrating dialogue is assured” (P15, United Kingdom). 
Additionally, “the role of the chair is crucial for all directors, but even more so for 
women and ethnic minorities. An effective chairman invites comments, solicits 
input, and gives visual cues of contact and interest” (P8, Ghana). 
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Ghanaian directors emphasize the importance of an effective chairperson. 
One added:  
Effective boards work within a regulatory framework but create 
their own shared understanding specific to the organization that 
they govern. They develop their own rules of engagement with 
executives, regulators, and market, as well as form diversity among 
other things. (P10, Ghana).  
Essentially, women’s contributions are likely to differ in response to each 
board’s idiosyncratic circumstances and each chairperson. The chairperson can 
play an important role in identifying and focusing issues that require women 
directors’ attention. If the chairperson does not pay attention to effective 
integration of women, it can be very frustrating for those women to take part in 
and consequently achieve a contribution to board effectiveness. It is the 
chairperson’s responsibility to create space in meetings for everyone to contribute 
and manage the interaction between a group of highly opinionated people 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008).  
To contribute to company performance, 
Boards tend to focus predominantly on a shareholder perspective 
rather than taking a holistic perspective on business. Soft issues are 
often overlooked, and I think that diverse boards are more effective 
in dealing with softer but fundamental issues, such as employee 
working conditions and business ethics. … Women are more 
innovative and are likely to find creative solutions to posed 
challenges’ (P12, Ghana).  
This is supported by research that shows how women in leadership roles are more 
likely to foster innovation and creativity in the organizations they lead (Idris, 
2009).  
The emergent consensus among study participants is that diverse boards are 
more likely to have more open dialogue and to be concerned about stakeholders 
(Table III). However, there is no single practice to make the board effective due to 
the idiosyncratic nature of boards (Kakabadse et al., 2006, 2010). 
[Insert Table III about here] 
Gender Quotas for the Boardroom 
Although the need to have more women on boards has been acknowledged 
(Catalyst, 2011), the participants offered a negative view on the effect of quotas on 
board performance:  
Quotas undermine these women who worked very hard to get 
where they are now. Organizations can widen the pool of talented 
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individuals suitable for board positions by grooming women first 
… and actively encouraging talented women to find roles as NEDs 
with other organizations. (P16, UK). 
This resonated with female directors from Ghana, who held that “the 
problem of female underrepresentation on the board cannot be solved by a quota 
system. We need a systemic education from the bottom up” (P26, Ghana). An 
American counterpart also rejected the notion of quotas: “No, definitely no quotas! 
Quotas would undermine our achievements” (P25, USA). Despite awareness that 
quotas could accelerate progress and reduce gender discrimination in the long 
term, many participants felt that quotas would hinder the efforts toward board 
effectiveness. This supports the argument that quotas bypass competitive 
processes and in turn sideline the merit principle that ensures the best person for 
the job (Dahlerup, Freidenvall, Stolt, Bivald, & Persson-Weiss, 2008). Yet some 
researchers demonstrate that resistance to quotas emanates from a culture of 
resistance against women’s full participation to positions of power and authority 
and that quotas and merit may indeed complement each other (Forstenlechner et 
al., 2012; Sayce & Özbilgin, 2014). Participants talked extensively about the 
importance of competence-based selection because they do not want to be in a 
situation where female differences in the boardroom are due to lesser 
qualifications and less ability, which could in turn devalue their achievement 
(Table IV). Singh et al. (2008) examines human capital of the newly appointed 
directors in an FTSE 100 firm and shows that female directors possess similar 
human capital to their male colleagues and contribute to the positive return on 
investments. The respondents expressed that they should be viewed as having 
gained their positions on merit. Moreover, they took pride that their hard work has 
changed attitudes about women in the boardroom and has served as a role model 
to aspiring women.  
Participants also recognized that their single voice on the board limited 
their contribution and that an increased female representation is imperative: 
 I feel that my contribution is limited. It’s a limitation because the 
board has a relatively singular perspective on the world and 
because board diversity is symbolic. I am the only woman on the 
board. (P19, United States). 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
Understanding women’s responses and resistance to quotas requires us to 
understand how the “field” operates. Masculine boardroom domination means that 
women join as outsiders, only to accept rather than challenge male norms, one of 
which remains the idea that merit, competence, and performance of the board are 
free from gender bias. Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence, referring to the 
tacit and unconscious forms of domination in which the subjugated may uphold 
discourses and at the same time disadvantage their social group, may account for 
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women’s resistance to quotas. Bourdieusian framing may be particularly pertinent 
as gender quotas are reported to enhance rather than diminish meritocracy.  
From the data, we understand that women on boards are conforming to the 
rules of the field and utilizing the given paths of development, communication, 
and expressing their career goals and the ways in which to reach them. 
Nonetheless, they also exhibit a very strong developmental orientation. This is 
evidenced in the ways they stress not only the procedural aspects (tacit or explicit) 
of board-related interactions, but also the learning and development orientation of 
their relationships and work processes, including advancement of the relevant 
human capital. This can also be one of the major ways in which women are 
reshaping the field, as organizational actors. Such a contribution can, in effect, 
shape and benefit the board in several ways, particular future achievement.  
Conclusions 
The corporate governance literature suggests the benefits of board diversity, 
but relevant studies remain inconclusive on whether increased gender diversity 
results in improved performance. Evidence-based literature still, largely, fails to 
understand the real practices of women board directors. This gap has led us to 
conduct interviews with women in the boardroom. The research draws attention to 
female practitioner perspectives, based on their experience and interrelationship 
with male colleagues. The study addresses, in particular, the factors that hinder or 
help promote board gender diversity, as well as the extent to which women 
directors can fully contribute to corporate governance efficacy. 
The research frames the attitudes, behaviors, and skills of women directors 
in three categories: quotas, supportive contributors, and serious players. In relation 
to each of them, we identify the obstacles for women to be effective on the board 
and, in particular, the role of the chairperson in informing such effectiveness. 
The study reveals that the participating companies have not adopted a 
strategic approach to managing gender diversity on the board. Women directors 
behave differently from their male counterparts; when they are in leadership roles, 
they are subject to close scrutiny (Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, & Bongiorno, 2011). 
They tend to remain friendly and supportive with the fear of marginalization, 
while men can show assertiveness in the absence of such a group threat. 
Compliance with the logic of the field provides a route for women to gain access, 
credibility, and development. 
Overall, our respondents regard board diversity as an important goal worth 
pursuing and note that it is particularly relevant in candidate selection. Participant 
rationales that justify board diversity fall into two broad categories: (1) a 
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functional category that relates to corporate performance and (2) a representative 
category that relates to employee motivation and customer loyalty. The argument 
perched on corporate performance emphasizes that boardroom discussion is richer, 
while creativity and different perspectives are more productive, with a diverse 
group of directors that in turn reduces the likelihood of uncritical “groupthink.” 
Such a group of directors can also bring access to different resources. These 
findings echo other scholars’ arguments that diversity can increase creativity and 
innovation and can improve problem solving (Daily & Dalton, 2003; Robinson & 
Dechant, 1997). 
Our results highlight the importance of increasing the number of women 
directors in the boardroom, but not through quotas. All of our respondents agree 
that board diversity is good, as it brings a mix of skills and background and makes 
it more effective. However, they fear that enforcing board gender quotas could 
ultimately undermine the value that women directors create. The respondents 
present themselves as individuals who have been selected on the basis of their 
merit. Despite the general alarm of our participants about the possible negative 
consequences of quotas, research identifies that quotas do not have to contradict 
with competence and merit-based systems (Forstenlechner et al., 2012; Tatli, 
Vassilopoulou, Ariss, & Özbilgin, 2012). The participants’ responses may be the 
result of dominant discourses of resistance against women’s full inclusion in the 
boardroom, which are not only practiced by men but also by women, who have 
achieved their success in the context of male domination. The findings also reveal 
the chairperson’s role in promoting women’s engagement as a way of recruitment 
and evaluation of their commitment to the board. The sudden demand for women 
directors gives respondents an opportunity to choose a board where they feel they 
can obtain the chairperson’s support and add value.  
One of the major contributions of the article is the theoretical and empirical 
extensions of previous discussions on board gender diversity, which go beyond 
direct relationships with financial performance, by focusing on real practices. As 
previous studies have shown (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003), board processes are 
key to board effectiveness. However, as Pye and Pettigrew (2005, p. 32) 
poignantly point out, the “contextual fabric … reflects very differently on the 
choices made by directors and boards in their doing of corporate directing and any 
subsequent judgments of effectiveness.” Boardroom diversity is not always 
directly related to corporate performance, but rather to the quality of decisions. 
Thus, this article fills a gap in the gender diversity literature by highlighting some 
of the benefits of a more gender-balanced board, and contributes toward a richer 
understanding of the multiple levels of interactions between social actors and 
structures in the study of women on boards and gender as a factor of diversity. The 
findings suggest a range of implications for practitioners. First, there is a need to 
evaluate the efficacy of recent regulations on board diversity. Second, it is 
important to encourage women respondents through education, mentoring, and 
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networking. Whatever the reason (e.g., structural or cultural), there are still 
relatively few women who have “reached the top” in the corporate world. 
Moreover, those who have reached the top enjoy their privileged status and are 
protective of it. Our study therefore supports the argument that there may be 
continuity of culture of privilege and power, in the context of changes in 
demography and representation (Sayce & Özbilgin, 2014). Our respondents shared 
many subtleties, social niceties, and latent power that may be key elements in 
linking the transnational elite, despite differences in countries’ GDI, GII, and other 
rankings. The relevance of this finding would benefit from more theoretical 
development, particularly on the discussion of the interweaving issues of the 
transnational female elite’s power.  
The results from our study suggest that there is a need for further research 
on board diversity, including qualitative research, to address methodological 
limitations of previous studies. Although women directors need to have the power 
or capability to act independently, there is little understanding of how women 
directors deal with hidden meanings, silence, embedded norms and values, and 
invisible power relations in the boardroom, as well as how they exercise their 
power or, in some cases, construct political coalitions (Pettigrew & McNulty, 
1995).  
The extant literature suggests that financial benefits of diversity should not 
be the only driving force and therefore should not be overstated. Future studies 
should examine the real benefits of board diversity and the mechanisms or 
processes that can help women identify and develop their talent and fulfill their 
ambitions. The viewpoints from institutional investors and male counterparts are 
also relevant to assess the advantages and disadvantages of board diversity. In 
future research, such stakeholders could also be included as part of a relevant 
sample. Our results suggest that there are nonfinancial benefits relating to board 
diversity such as important signaling to stakeholders, enhancing corporate 
reputation, role modeling, changing patterns of boardroom decision making, and, 
above all, making full use of available talent. Finally, the conclusions of our study 
add to the body of the resource-based theory, by extending it to boardroom 
relations. This research contributes to the understanding of how female directors’ 
resources, such as skill as networks, together with their career orientation to 
participate in the boardroom, contribute to the increase of their presence on 
organizations’ boards.  
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Table I. Population in 2010 and Sample  
 United 
Kingdom United States Ghana 
Number of boards with: FTSE 50 Fortune 50 Club 50 
   One female 21 6 17 
   Two females 13 20 7 
   Three females 9 13 3 
   More than three women directors 0 6 0 
Sample 10 10 10 
Table II. Work Relationships in the Boardrooms 
Category Property Dimension 
Work Relationships in the 
Boardrooms 
Credibility High … Low 
Fitting in  Well … Not well 
Emotional intelligence High … Low 
Interpersonal skills Effective … Ineffective 
Voice tone Deep … Shrilling 
Chairman’s skills High … Low 
Source: Compiled from data. 
Table III. Women Contribution and Board Performance 
Category Property Dimension 
Women Contribution and 
Board Performance 
Dialogue Effective … Ineffective 
Courage High … Low 
Innovation High … Low 
Competitive advantage High … Low 
Leadership Effective … Ineffective 
Chairperson effectiveness Effective … Ineffective  
Source: Compiled from data. 
Table IV. Boardroom Quotas 
Category Property Dimension 
Boardroom Quotas Merit High … Low  
Wider pool  Open … Closed 
Competence-based selection High … Low 
Source: Compiled from data.  
 
